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Fitbit pre-earnings wrap-up and article -4
02:02 23-Oct-17
Both the app developer and I have now finished reviewing the
current state Fitbit's developer tools. There's final feedback
from the primary user, as well, and I've run some numbers (all non
per-share values are in millions.) There are still a lot of
moving parts and variability, but it's time for best guesses. The
executive summary remains that Fitbit should be headed for a big
quarterly beat or two, based on low expectations, but the business
is probably set to fade from there. Here are my numbers and
reasoning:
Base Case: Fitbit's core competencies and market
devices sold | revenue | avg dev price | gross margin | gross profit | dev+SG&A expense | EBITDA | shares | EBITDA /share | GAAP EPS | non-GAAP EPS | |
3Q16 | 5.3 | 504 | 95.09 | 48.3% | 243.4 | 196.2 | 47.3 | 222.4 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.19 |
4Q16 | 6.5 | 574 | 88.31 | 22.4% | 128.6 | 311.9 | −183.3 | 224.4 | −0.82 | −0.65 | −0.56 |
1Q17 | 3 | 298.9 | 99.63 | 40.0% | 119.6 | 209.7 | −90.1 | 226.5 | −0.40 | −0.27 | −0.15 |
2Q17 | 3.4 | 353 | 103.82 | 43.0% | 151.8 | 212.7 | −60.9 | 230.3 | −0.26 | −0.25 | −0.08 |
3Q17 | 233 | −0.04 | |||||||||
IonicFY17 | 4 | 1200 | 300.00 | 40.0% | 480.0 | 350 | 130 | 236 | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
FlyerFY17 | 1.32 | 171.6 | 130.00 | 48.0% | 82.4 | 82.4 | 236 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 | |
4Q17 | −0.03 | ||||||||||
FY17 | 11.72 | 2023.5 | 172.65 | 42.8% | 833.7 | 772.332 | 61.4 | 236 | 0.26 | 0.37986 | 0.60 |
StBFO | 18.22 | 2597.5 | 142.56 | 38.7% | 962.3 | 1084.19 | −121.9 | 236 | −0.52 | −0.2701 | 0.04 |
This represents my best guess on where numbers might come in based on the all the data I've presented so far. The Ionic and Flyer FY17 rows represent the combination of 3Q17 and 4Q17. I don't really care what the split between the third and fourth quarters winds up being, and I don't think the market will either. On the other hand, I do care about EBITDA and GAAP numbers, whereas the market is likely to focus on non-GAAP. Unlike with other companies I follow, I simply don't think Fitbit management has earned that sort of trust, as it finally transitions from a first-mover advantage on cheap devices, to a competitive and pricier market. Moreover, I care about the product cycle throughout the transition, rather than the full-year numbers that the market is likely to focus on. Thus, in the bottom line, StBFO stands for "Since the Bottom Fell Out", in 4Q16. I think this measure is important because it represents a financial cycle that Fitbit will probably have to repeat.
Another point to note is that I'm guessing that about one third of Ionic buyers will add the Flyer headphones to their purchase, and that the Flyer will be higher margin. Assuming that management continues to report number of devices sold, we should be able to estimate the split from the revenue. Of course, if the ratio is higher that will be better for Fitbit, but I think this statement from the primary tester,
I don't want my watch to become my phone.speaks to Fitbit's activity-tracking corporate and sales DNA. In fact, she's turned off pretty much all of the messaging notifications, and just about every review out there indicates that those who want a general purpose smart-watch have clearly better options already available.
My Base Case also guesstimates that Fitbit will have some trouble
up-selling its existing user base to a more expensive device.
Many find the older wristbands indispensable as a motivational
tool, but the main improvement of the Ionic is better sensors, and
thus data; it's questionable how motivational better data actually
is. If Fitbit's community goes stale and it gets even the whiff
of being a fad, that spells real trouble. I've checked
anecdotally with a group of legacy device users who used to
compare step counts, to see who might be upgrading, but the
response I got from the ringleader was, "I don't know. I haven't
worn my Fitbit in months."
Software Development is the Real Long-term Problem
Recall that my original thesis was that Fitbit's debt-free
acquisition of the Pebble and other platforms would enable it to
design a better all-purpose smart-watch. I still believe it has
managed to do so in terms of hardware, but unfortunately, that is
only half the picture. The fitness instructor uses the watch for
teaching classes, but she would like more functionality, such as
that provided by the app built by the software tester. He started
out by being very interested in bringing his code to a single
platform that would interface with both Android and iOS. That
enthusiasm faded quickly, though, once he took an in-depth look at
the state of the tool set.
Over the past few weeks, Fitbit has begun throwing up
documentation on its APIs, but whereas Pebble allowed local
development using familiar tools, Fitbit is trying to foist its
own cloud-based IDE (integrated development environment) on
programmers, which creates an unnecessary learning/familiarization
curve. It also has no emulator or testing environment to speak
of, and the juxtaposition of needing a watch in-hand to storing
and evolving one's code off-site is bizarre, to say the least.
Furthermore, Pebble allowed development using the C language, but
Fitbit is offering only Javascript for the Ionic. Javascript
popularity has exploded with the web, but it is a very different
animal, especially for writing code on devices with limited
processing capabilities.
Although our programmer has published multiple apps and done lots
of Javascript coding, he declined even take a shot at porting the
project to Fitbit. As a programmer myself, I can't say that I
blame him. None of us needs extra time-consuming steps, and it
took almost two hours for Fitbit to even send an email
verification for my account. I think there is a very good chance
that Fitbit's software ecosystem will never be competitive with
the likes of Android or iOS, and I don't just mean in terms of
number of applications available. The environment simply creates
too many hoops for new developers to jump through and it does not
look like it will ever offer the flexibility and power that would
enable truly talented programmers to create the next killer app.
That's a shame, because with the best sensors on the market,
Fitbit has the opportunity to build its lead on a valuable
health-centric data set. However, with the legacy data being
relatively low quality, a diminishing user and developer base
would quickly make that a moot point. There's plenty of evidence
that both Apple
and Alphabet
are ready to focus much bigger budgets on a much broader approach
to building such a knowledge base.
The Silver Lining and Conclusion
None of this means that Fitbit is irrevocably doomed. Tweaking
the base case above shows that it needs to sell only about 4.5M
Ionics to erase the past year's losses, on a GAAP basis, or 4.9M
for EBITDA. That's not too far off from the guesses I've made,
and if the company manages to sell a higher percentage of Flyers
with the watch, those hurdles drop further. I could easily
imagine the unrealistically negative press campaign that we saw
over the summer flipping positive in the wake of non-GAAP beats.
Fitbit should have some macro tailwinds as well. Income
bifurcation means more high-end spending, and JC Penney
re-branding its jewelry department with a focus on smart-watches
is the latest sign that the segment is going mainstream. Note,
however, that the press
release lists Samsung, LG and Garmin as the top brands.
Fitbit is not even mentioned, and the Ionic is near the top end of
the $155 to $349 price range, despite sub-par software and
messaging. In the end, though, the fitness instructor/model chose
to keep her Ionic rather than put the purchase price toward other
uses. The reasoning seems to be that it is shiny and does what it
was meant to well enough, even though she has fitness related
wish-list items that it will probably never fulfill. Such
semi-novelty decisions could help Fitbit to transition its user
base over the remainder of the year. Feature and use
case comparisons (read to the end, if you read it at all)
probably will not.
Looking a bit deeper, the problems I've highlighted are
important, but not permanently built into the device. Software is
more fluid than hardware. Both that and brand image are things
that Fitbit could fix up over the months to come. I'll be
listening for indications that management recognizes the urgency
of doing so, but the opposite seems to be the case. I hope I'm
wrong, and if so, quantified projections for improving the
software environment, as well as near-term sales numbers will be
needed to change my long-term outlook. Of course, sales are most
important, but if we wind up with middling sales projections and
no positive surprises on the software, I'll be inclined to take a
contrarian view to any earnings positivity, using it as an exit
point. I would also like to publish an article, to call out some
of the increasingly unbalanced financial coverage that I've been
seeing, either before or after the next earnings report. I'll
heavily factor any subscriber feedback that I get into the timing
of such an article.